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NATIONAL/TACTICAL INTERFACE

Question - ☐ Is it your impression from your own perspective that we are learning to cope with these issues seriatim, or at risk of losing ground to requirements of increasing stringency and systems of greatly increased cost and some technological uncertainty? Or both? 25X1

Answer - ☐ It is my impression that the DCI and IC Staff have been overly committed to the national level users, primarily in the Washington, DC area. The spending on "national" systems reflects this, and does so at greater magnitudes of expense. The DCI and staff are just now recognizing that equally important needs exist at the theater military levels and have been going unanswered. While not mutually exclusive, the information needs of the national and tactical levels are certainly not totally common either. The DCI and staff, as we all, must recognize that in light of escalating technology and cost, especially for over-head systems, we must strike a balance between national and tactical needs and seek the satisfaction of those needs through a blend of the NFIP and other intelligence-related efforts. 25X1

Question - ☐ Do the major issues seem to be ones of fiscal means and priorities, of tasking priorities, of institutional boundaries, of disagreement over the technical feasibility/cost-effectiveness of a task? In what proportions? 25X1

Answer - ☐ The key issues in the use of national systems to support tactical needs stem from the isolation of the national systems' controlling authority (fiscal and tasking) from the tactical users. The fiscal means and priorities and the tasking priorities reside within those also responsible for defining and responding to national level requirements. I don't think it's unfair to say that human and organizational nature will tend to be biased toward the requirements and source of requirements that are closest in supervisory and geographical proximity. The DCI and staff must consciously strive for objectivity toward all requirements. More balanced consideration of all requirements and decisions on fiscal and tasking matters will follow. 25X1

Question - ☐ It is our impression that tactical commanders, especially those operating within an alliance, are concerned that the products of national systems can cause almost as many problems as they solve if those products are not releasable to allied units within their formations or on their flanks (to include, in peacetime, for training and staff and communications development). From your perspectives, how intractable is this problem? Is it essentially political in nature, or technical? Or is consideration of fundamental change in national disclosure policies indicated? 25X1

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Answer -

ve a. [] Tactical commanders are generally not yet convinced that "national" systems can be honestly relied upon as significant players in a theater conflict. []

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Management and control of these systems is remote from the battlefield and peacetime "demonstrations" do not fully convince commanders that the national community will effectively respond to the high volume and priorities of wartime requirements. The extra security constraints on the systems and restrictions on releasability of the data collected add to theater commanders' suspicions that national systems should not be heavily relied upon. While there is greatly increasing understanding and use of these systems in peacetime by theater military forces, the firm commitment of exactly what support can be expected from national systems in war has not yet been made. Releasability, tasking procedures, security clearances, and the remoteness of the national community will remain intractable symptoms of the problem until such a commitment is made to and accepted by theater commanders.

ok b. [] The possibility of fundamental changes in US national intelligence release policies, or creation of a new unified intelligence disclosure policy, is currently being evaluated by working levels of the US intelligence and disclosure communities. The ultimate objective of this exploratory activity is to achieve greater intelligence flow to allies, particularly NATO commanders. However, the effort is currently so "blue sky" that hard questions such as the scope of national policy changes, how to accomplish them, and whether changes are even advisable, have not yet been addressed. For these reasons, it would be premature for the DCI to refer to possible changes in national intelligence disclosure policies in his Annual Report. Congress is likely to misunderstand and any NIO/I&W early priorities in this regard could prove very difficult to achieve.

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Question - [] What general observations can you make from your perspectives about the major needs vs. useability trade-offs involved in determining the volume of national intelligence designated for lower tactical echelons, including aspects such as communications saturation, optimum level(s) to locate the intelligence useability discrimination function, etc?

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Answer - [] The useability of national system derived intelligence must receive decentralized determination by individual tactical users. In general terms the national systems can be extremely valuable for providing commanders with battle management intelligence. By its nature, this type of intelligence is broad in scope

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and difficult to filter. The first step in beginning to match useability with need is the theater collection management function. If military users receive sufficient responsiveness from these systems to learn the intricacies of their operation and exactly what can be expected from them (war and peace), we will have the first handle on how to efficiently ask for and absorb their products. This first step could then be followed with appropriate adjustment of techniques and procedures at the national end of the production line.

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